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The roles of selection and endogeneity in measured risk preferences are illustrated using the 
correlation between risk attitudes and firm survival. Selection bias occurs when risk attitudes are 
elicited only from current entrepreneurs so that the risk attitudes of unsuccessful entrepreneurs 
are excluded from the analysis. Risk attitudes measured after agents enter entrepreneurship will 
endogenously reflect business success. Data on entrepreneurs from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics shows that when risk attitudes 
are measured subject to selection and endogeneity, mixed or even positive correlations between 
risk acceptance and the probability of firm exit occur. However, firm exits fall monotonically 
with willingness to accept risk when risk preference measures are not subject to selection or 




















Empirical studies linking risk attitudes and economic outcomes typically assume that risk 
preferences are stable over time. However, a growing body of evidence indicates that risk 
preferences change in response to changing personal economic situations or demographics (Cho 
et al. 2018; Brachert et al. 2017, 2019; Hetschko and Preuss 2019) and changing macroeconomic 
circumstances (Sahm 2012; Dohmen et al. 2016; Bucciol and Miniaci 2018: Tausch and 
Zumbuehl 2018). The instability of individual risk attitudes is also found to be related to changes 
in individual life events such as the experience of poverty (Haushofer and Fehr 2014), childbirth 
(Görlitz and Tamm 2015), exposure to violence (Callen et al. 2014; Guiso et al. 2018), and 
experiencing an earthquake (Hanaoka et al. 2018).  
Given that risk attitudes can be shaped by individual or macroeconomic circumstances, 
associating individual economic outcomes to current risk attitudes could bias the estimated effect 
of risk attitudes. An example that we investigate is establishing the effect of risk attitude on 
entrepreneurial survival or success. Past studies investigating the role of entrepreneurs’ risk 
attitudes in firm survival have yielded inconsistent results that, as we demonstrate, is related to 
the timing of the measured risk attitudes. Risk preferences measured after the start of an 
entrepreneurial venture are subject to two sources of time-varying risk attitudes: the endogenous 
risk preference response to changing economic circumstances of the venture, and sample 
selection from the exit of the least successful entrepreneurs. As we show in this study, decisions 
on how to structure the sample of entrepreneurs and when to measure risk preferences can 
reverse conclusions regarding the relationship between risk aversion and entrepreneurial success.  
Because the weight of available evidence suggests that risk preferences change in 
response to changing economic circumstances, it is important to investigate how or whether the 
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correlation between economic outcomes and measured risk preferences also changes depending 
on when those preferences are measured and who is included in the test sample. Using a simple 
two-period model, we show that nonrandom sorting out of entrepreneurship based on risk 
aversion can bias the estimated relationship between entrepreneurial survival and risk 
preferences. Using longitudinal data on cohorts of entrepreneurs culled from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
we illustrate how endogenously measured risk preferences and sample selection based on 
surviving firms can bias the measured effect of risk attitudes on firm survival. We first 
demonstrate that measured risk preferences change with entrepreneurial success. We then show 
that using ex post measured risk preferences or including only current entrepreneurs in the 
analysis will bias the estimated effect of risk preferences on entrepreneurial success. When the 
analysis includes measures of risk preferences that predate entry into entrepreneurship, and when 
the sample includes all entrepreneurs in a cohort rather than just the surviving ones, there is 
strong and consistent evidence that it is the least risk-averse entrepreneurs that are the most 
successful.    
The next section summarizes the previous literature. Section 3 uses a simple theoretical 
illustration to show how nonrandom sorting out of entrepreneurship can affect the observed 
relationship between risk aversion and firm success. In section 4, we describe the methodology 
and data used to approximate the theoretical relationships. Section 5 provides evidence that risk 
preferences change as economic circumstances change. Section 6 replicates the findings of past 
studies relating firm success to risk preferences in the presence of endogenously measured risk 
attitudes and selection on firm survival. We then illustrate how the results change when we 
correct for endogenous preferences and sample selection. Section 7 concludes and provides some 
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policy implications.  
 
2 Literature Review  
 
Risk attitudes influence individual decisions to become an entrepreneur. However, studies 
investigating the role of entrepreneurs’ risk attitudes in firm survival have yielded inconsistent 
results. Begley and Boyd’s (1987) analysis of 239 surviving firms in New England found that 
rising risk aversion was positively correlated with the ratio of firm assets to liabilities, 
uncorrelated with firm growth rates, and had a U-shaped relationship with return on assets. 
Similarly, Caliendo et al. (2010), Kreiser et al. (2013), and Nieβ and Biemann (2014) found that 
firm success rises initially with willingness to take on risk but that success falls off for the least 
risk-averse. All of these studies also were based on samples of existing firms. The firms that had 
already perished are selected out of the analysis. If risk preferences affect survival, then sorting 
out a subset of failing firms may cause a selection bias on the estimated relationship between risk 
preferences and firm success based on the survivors.     
Selection problems are particularly important for studies of entrepreneurial success 
because most ventures fail, and most fail at young ages. National statistics for the U.S. show that 
one-third of ventures fail within two years and two-thirds fail within six years (Knaup and Piazza 
2007), a pattern similar to that of other countries (Mata and Portugal 1994; Disney et al. 2003). 
Any sample of risk preferences of existing entrepreneurs will select out the risk preferences of 
the failed entrepreneurs (Steward and Roth 2001) and atypically select out the risk preferences of 
the least-experienced. This selection problem will bias the realized returns to entrepreneurship, 
restricting the group to the rare atypically successful start-ups. When analysis of firm success is 
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based on a sample of existing firms, the relationship between firm tenure and firm exits will be 
distorted in ways that can lead to inconsistent results. As examples, Evans (1987) reports a U-
shaped relationship between firm survival and firm age, whereas Cefis and Marsili (2005) find 
an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
In addition, if risk preferences are elicited from a sample of surviving firms, the risk 
preferences may be shaped by their realized success. Compelling evidence that risk preferences 
adapt to experience has been reported by Malmendier et al. (2011), Malmendier and Nagel 
(2011), Hoffmann et al. (2013), Weber et al. (2013), Gerrans et al. (2015), Necker and 
Ziegelmeyer (2016), and Hoffmann and Post (2017).1 Entrepreneurs whose ventures have 
performed better than market expectations may become less risk-averse while those who have 
experienced more modest success may become more cautious over time. Alternatively, 
successful entrepreneurs may become more risk averse because they want to protect the venture 
from losses. In either case, as long as measured risk preferences change with success, use of 
endogenously measured risk preferences to predict firm performance or survival will bias results. 
Brachert et al. (2017, 2019) found that entry into entrepreneurship increased entrepreneurs’ 
willingness to accept risk even as willingness to accept risk increased persistence in self-
employment. The review by Schildberg-Hörisch (2018) concluded that risk attitudes change with 
age and economic crises, and that the correlation of individual risk preferences over time are too 
                                           
1 Experiments where positive or negative outcomes are randomly assigned have typically found evidence that 
individuals adjust risk preferences in response to outcomes, although not always in consistent ways. Lucky 
outcomes typically lead to subsequent less risk-averse behavior (Binswanger 1981; Thaler and Johnson 1990; Weber 
and Zuchel 2005; Liu et al. 2010). However, losses can also lead to efforts to make back losses by taking on riskier 




low to justify stable risk preferences.  
Another strand of literature focuses on how entrepreneurial orientation (EO) affects firm 
performance. Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) refers to “the methods, practices, and decision-
making style” that managers use to act entrepreneurially. According to Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996), EO includes five dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, 
risk-taking, and autonomy. While most studies suggest a positive effect of EO on firm 
performance (Rauch et al. 2009; Anderson et al. 2009), a few studies find an inverted U-shape 
relationship between EO and performance (Tang et al. 2008; Wales et al. 2013b). Increased EO 
beyond a certain threshold could potentially harm a firm’s performance (Zahra 1993). On the 
other hand, EO is also associated with greater variance in firm success (Wiklund and Shepherd 
2011; Wales et al 2013a). Their theoretical argument was based on the perspective of EO as “the 
exploration of new possibilities” rather than “exploitation of old certainties” as distinguished by 
March (1991). However, whether the positive relationship between EO and variance in the 
performance holds over time is still an open question because of possible strategic learning 
(Wales et al. 2013a). Greater EO may reduce firm performance variance in that EO can generate 
strategic learning capability (Anderson et al. 2009). This is in line with recent experimental 
evidence linking cognitive ability with a greater willingness to accept risk (Frederick 2005; 
Dohmen et al. 2010; Benjamin et al. 2013; Dohmen et al. 2018) or higher cognitive skills and the 
quality of decision-making (Grinblatt et al. 2011; Hasting et al. 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 
2014). 
Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) reported that entrepreneurial orientation including 
willingness to take on risk increased firm failure even as it increased average profits. Because 
some of the firms at the beginning of their study had exited by the end, the authors applied 
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Heckman’s (1976) selection correction and claimed they had resolved the selection problem.  
However, their initial sample was drawn from existing firms and so many firms had already gone 
out of business and could not be incorporated into their selection correction. Their estimated 
relationship between risk preferences and the remaining firms’ profitability would still reflect the 
sorting out of many unsuccessful firms. Studies that claim to control for selection only do so 
correctly if they include random samples of all the members of the firm entry cohort, survivors 
and failures, as we do in this study. Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) also use responses to the 
Covin-Slevin (1989) battery of questions to derive their EO measure. But, the questions already 
presume existing firms, and so the responses would reflect the endogenous reaction to each 
entrepreneur’s relative success. As Miller (2011) points out, the potential for endogeneity is an 
inherent feature of the empirical EO literature.  
Recently, Sedláček and Sterk (2017) found that firm growth depended critically on the 
economic conditions at the time of entry. Their finding confirms that an analysis based on entry 
cohorts is important in order to hold constant the economic circumstances that would shape 
observed risk preferences and the fraction of surviving firms.  
We contribute to the literature on firm survival and risk attitudes by investigating 
whether endogenous risk preferences and selection on survival can alter the observed correlation 
between risk preferences and an entrepreneur’s success.   
 
3 Theoretical illustration: Risk preferences and entrepreneurial survival 
 
This section presents a simple model to show how risk attitudes affect entrepreneurial survival. 
The model shows why nonrandom sorting out of entrepreneurship based on risk aversion can 
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bias the estimated relationship between entrepreneurial survival and risk preferences. 
Suppose that there is a continuum of potential entrepreneurs who differ only in degree of 
risk aversion but not skill. Each of the potential entrepreneurs will face the same present value of 





𝑒                 (1) 
where 𝑋0 is a vector of observable individual characteristics known at time of entry and 𝜖0
𝑒 is 
an unforecastable random shock realized after entry and assumed to be normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance, 𝜎𝑦𝑒
2 . To simplify the discussion, we are assuming that the realization of 
𝜖0
𝑒 represents a common shock to all ventures in the cohort, but allowing for idiosyncratic 
shocks does not alter the conclusions.   
Let utility be characterized by the exponential form, 𝑈𝑖
𝑒(y0
𝑒) = −exp⁡(−γ𝑖y0
𝑒), where γ𝑖 
is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for individual i. Under these assumptions, expected 
utility is separable in expected income and risk and can be written as  
E(𝑈𝑖
𝑒(y0
𝑒)) = 𝛼𝑒 + 𝑋0
′𝛽𝑋
𝑒 − 𝛾𝑖𝜎𝑦𝑒
2                                      (2) 
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𝑤 + 𝛼𝑤 − 𝛾𝑖𝜎𝑦𝑤
2                            (4) 
where 𝛼𝑤 is the hedonic value of wage work and 𝜎𝑦𝑤
2  is the variance of pay from wage work.  







𝑤)). There will be some value of 𝛾𝑖, say 𝛾0
𝑚, where individual i is 
exactly indifferent between being an entrepreneur and working for a wage. That is, 
E(𝑈𝑖
𝑒(y0
𝑒)) = ⁡ E(𝑈𝑖
𝑤(𝑦0
𝑤)). 

















2                                               (5) 
We presume that 𝜎𝑦𝑒
2 > 𝜎𝑦𝑤
2  so that entrepreneurial income is less certain than wage 
income. That means that if risk-averse individuals are to enter entrepreneurship so that 𝛾𝑖 > 0,  
(𝛼𝑒 − 𝛼𝑤) + 𝑋0
′(𝛽𝑋
𝑒 − 𝛽𝑋
𝑤) > 0. Under those assumptions, the period 0 cohort of entrepreneurs 
will be defined by 𝛾𝑖 ≤ 𝛾0
𝑚. All other identically skilled but more risk-averse individuals will 









2 )               (6) 
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of 𝛾𝑖. 
After entry, the cohort of entrepreneurs will learn the values of 𝜖0
𝑒 and 𝜖0
𝑤. We assume 







2 ≥ 0 so that returns to entrepreneurship rise relative to wage work, whether 
from rising entrepreneurial earnings, falling wage income, or both, the entire cohort of 






2 < 0, then some 
entrepreneurs will switch to wage work.   
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2 < 𝛾𝑖)                         (7) 
which is strictly increasing in risk aversion. Hence, the entrepreneurs who are most likely to exit 
due to falling prospects for the venture or rising opportunity costs from wage work will be the 
most risk-averse entrepreneurs.2 
 Equation (7) implies that sorting out of entrepreneurship based on risk aversion can bias 
the estimated effect of risk aversion on entrepreneurial survival. If we include only surviving 
ventures in the analysis instead of entry cohorts, the selected sample based on risk aversion is 
nonrandom. During cyclical downturns in returns to entrepreneurship, only the least risk-averse 
entrepreneurs will stay. On the other hand, the most risk-averse will stay only when there are 
neutral or positive shocks to entrepreneurial profits. Hence, samples of surviving entrepreneurs 
will atypically include higher average profit, high risk-averse entrepreneurs, and lower average 
profit, less risk-averse entrepreneurs,3 even though the true relationship in our illustration is that 
risk-aversion has no bearing on the profitability of the venture.  
                                           
2 This result conflicts with Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) who argue that those with greater willingness to take on 
risk are more likely to fail. Wiklund and Shepherd (Figure 1 and pages 927-928) presume that there are two ventures 
with the same average return, but one (sample A firms) have a higher variance than the other (sample B firms). 
Firms in sample A taking the higher variance option will exit more frequently, while the realized returns for the 
surviving firms from sample A will be higher than for sample B. However, no risk averse firms would ever select the 
high variance option when the low variance option with the same return is available. Therefore, their finding that 
firms taking on more risk are more likely to fail is due to their unstated assumption that the sample A firms are risk 
loving while the sample B firms are risk averse. Our contrasting result in (7) presumes that all entrepreneurs are risk 
averse but to different degrees, and that all entrepreneurs are facing the same options with the same mean and 
variance. In our empirical work, only risk averse preferences are allowed in the NLSY and the PSID data sets, and 
so we do not know how likely risk-loving preferences are. The widely observed positive relationship between risk 
and reward across many different investments suggests that our presumption that entrepreneurs are risk averse holds 
generally in the markets. If risk-loving entrepreneurs were prominent, they would be accepting a lower return in 
order to take on more risk.  
3 NLSY79 data confirms this theoretical argument. Among surviving firms, more risk averse entrepreneurs tend to 
earn higher business income than do their less risk averse counterparts.  
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 An expanded model of risk preferences and venture success 
In practice, risk preferences, returns to entrepreneurship, and returns to wage work will 
all evolve over time, altering the proportion sorting out of entrepreneurship and the measured 
risk preferences of the survivors. Proper tests of the relationship between risk preferences and 
venture performance would have to confront both selection and endogenous risk aversion. Our 
model as summarized by equation (7) was limited to an illustration of how entrepreneurs who 
differ in time-invariant risk preferences but select the same venture would decide whether to 
remain in business when facing subsequent random shocks to their profitability. However, there 
are several ways that the model could be expanded to incorporate other possible confounders in 
assessing how risk preferences affect entrepreneurial success.  
The most important confounder is that, as we indicated in the literature review, 
willingness to accept greater risk appears to be related to other cognitive skills that may include 
the ability to allocate resources efficiently and the ability to manage risk. If true, then the 
expected return from entrepreneurial ventures in equation (1) would be decreasing in risk 
aversion and the variance of the venture in equation (2) would be increasing in risk aversion.4 To 
integrate these skill effects, we can characterize the rewards to entrepreneurial attributes in (1) by 





< 0.⁡ We can 







This formulation treats the risk aversion parameter γ𝑖 simultaneously as an indicator of these 
unobserved managerial abilities. 
                                           
4 This is consistent with recent experimental evidence linking cognitive ability with a greater willingness to accept 
risk (Frederick 2005; Dohmen et al. 2010 Benjamin et al. 2013; Dohmen et al. 2018) and higher cognitive skills and 
the quality of decision-making (Grinblatt et al. 2011; Hasting et al. 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). 
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The second complication is that risk preferences appear to evolve over time as the 
venture succeeds or fails, although there some disagreement on whether risk aversion rises or 
falls with success. Some argue that entrepreneurs become more risk averse when their ventures 
succeed due to a desire to protect their endowments (Kahneman et al. 1991). Others argue that 
adverse business outcomes or cyclical downturns make individuals more cautious, and so 
success makes entrepreneurs less risk averse. In either case, however, we can characterize risk 
aversion by γ𝑖0 =⁡ γ𝑖(𝜖0
𝑒) so that risk preferences are shaped by the realized profitability of the 
firm after the cyclical profitability shock is realized (Hoffmann and Post 2017; Sedláček and 
Sterk 2017).  
If we insert the implications of risk aversion on skill into the threshold risk aversion 
equation (5), we find that  
𝛾0
𝑚′ =





2 (γ𝑖) − 𝜎𝑦𝑤
2  
where γ𝑖 is both the individual’s level of risk aversion before becoming an entrepreneur, but 
also an index of the entrepreneur’s unobserved managerial skills. The implication of the 
correlation between risk aversion and managerial skill on the threshold risk aversion level 



















2 (γ𝑖) − 𝜎𝑦𝑤
2 ]2
< 0 
If entrepreneurial skill falls as risk aversion increases, then the threshold risk aversion 
parameter is smaller than in (5). Only the very least risk averse will become entrepreneurs at 
ventures with modest prospects. The few more risk averse entrepreneurs will only enter ventures 
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with atypically good expected returns and low variances, and so they will look atypically 
successful because they would not attempt more challenging ventures. Assessing the impact of 
risk aversion on entrepreneurial success would be conditioned on the fact that relatively less risk 
averse individuals with the greatest managerial skills in the labor force make up most of the 
population of entrepreneurs with a few more risk averse entrepreneurs entering only the most 
promising start-ups.     
Inserting⁡ γ𝑖0, 𝛾0
𝑚′ and 𝜎𝑦𝑒










𝑒)),     (8) 
where γ𝑖0 =⁡ γ𝑖(𝜖0
𝑒) is the time-varying risk aversion conditioned on the realized profit. The 
implications for firm exits depends on whether adverse conditions make entrepreneurs more or 
less risk averse. If risk aversion increases when the cyclical shock is negative (i.e., 
𝜕𝛾𝑖0
𝜕𝜖0
𝑒 < 0) 
then there will be greater selection out of entrepreneurship during cyclical downturns as 
compared to equation (7). The reason is that 𝛾0
𝑚′ < 𝛾0
𝑚, 𝜎𝑦𝑒
2 (γ𝑖) < 𝜎𝑦𝑒
2  and so the negative 
realization of 𝜖0
𝑒 is discounted less heavily, and 𝛾𝑖(𝜖0
𝑒) > 𝛾𝑖 in the face of a negative 
profitability shock. Compared to our earlier results, cyclical downturns will have an even greater 
effect of eliminating the relatively more risk averse entrepreneurs, making the remaining risk 
averse entrepreneurs even more highly selected. If on the other hand, 
𝜕𝛾𝑖0
𝜕𝜖0
𝑒 > 0, then cyclical 
downturns will have an ambiguous effect on firm exits.  
This expanded model suggests that future research needs to establish more concretely 
how risk aversion sorts low and high risk averse individuals into entrepreneurship. Evidence on 
the relationship between risk aversion and business success could be biased by the selecting out 
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of the low risk averse individuals. If willingness to accept risk and unobserved managerial skills 
are positively correlated, then the estimated effect of risk aversion on business success could be 
biased by the correlation between risk preferences and unobserved entrepreneurial ability.  
Finally, if risk attitudes change over time, then firm exits will reflect both the changing economic 
circumstances and the changing risk aversion in response to those economic circumstances. All 
of these possibilities are fruitful and important avenues for understanding how firms succeed or 
fail. 
 
4 Methodology and data 
 
To test the impact of risk attitudes on firm failure, we employ a hazard regression. The hazard 








where F(𝑡𝑖) is the probability that the firm exits at 𝑡𝑖 and the associated probability density 
function is f(𝑡𝑖); S(𝑡𝑖) is the probability that the firm survives until time 𝑡𝑖. Assuming the 
survival time 𝑡𝑖 has a Weibull distribution, and guided by the model in the previous section, the 
hazard function at time 𝑡𝑖 for an individual i is given by  






where 𝑝 is an ancillary shape parameter to be estimated from the data. We define 𝜑𝑖𝑗 as the 
inverse of measured risk aversion (𝛾𝑖), 𝜑𝑖𝑗 , 𝑗 = 2,3,4, indicating progressively higher 
willingness to accept risk. The reference category (j=1) includes individuals who are unwilling to 
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take on any risk. The vector 𝑋𝑖 is composed of human capital and other socioeconomic 
variables that are expected to affect the entrepreneur’s nonpecuniary and pecuniary expected 
returns to entrepreneurship relative to wage work. We include education, previous labor market 
experience, age, and parental self-employment/management experience as factors affecting 
pecuniary cost of time, and marital status and number of children as factors affecting the 
nonpecuniary cost of time. Additional controls include regional and industry dummies to account 
for sectoral and regional macroeconomic conditions.  
We use firm survival as our measure of firm success. The year of entrepreneurial entry is 
identified when self-employment is reported in year t but not in any of the years preceding t. The 
exit year is measured as the middle year between the last reported self-employment year and the 
year of new employment status due to the biennial survey. We require a common window of time 
over which to judge a venture’s survival. Two-thirds of U.S. firms close within 6 years of entry 
and so firms that survive at least 6 years have performed well above average (Mata and Portugal 
1994; Audretsch and Mahmood 1995; Disney et al. 2003; Knaup and Piazza 2007). In this vein, 
we define entrepreneurial survival as remaining in business at least 6 years after startup and 
business failure as closing the business within the first 6 years.5 Note that an alternative measure 
of firm success would be to use reported firm profits or household income, both of which would 
measure the capitalized value of the firm with considerable measurement error. However, firm 
exits are good signals of low firm profitability.6  
                                           
5 We extended the time to 8 years to check for sensitivity of our findings to the definition of success, but the results 
are not sensitive to the alternative time window. 
6 Seventy-two percent of the exiting entrepreneurs in our sample reported zero profit shortly before business 
closure. The percentage rises to 95% at the time of exit. On the other hand, only 22% of surviving entrepreneurs 
reported zero profit (possibly negative profit) after 5 years from entry. The median profit is $11,384 for surviving 




Although we control for entrepreneurs’ observed characteristics, there may be 
unobserved factors that affect the entrepreneurial survival or failure. Hence, we employ a frailty 
model that accounts for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. The log-
likelihood function can be written as 
L(𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜃|𝑋𝑖, 𝜑𝑖) =∑{𝑑𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑓𝜃
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑡𝑖, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜃) + (1 − 𝑑𝑖)𝑙𝑛𝑆𝜃(𝑡𝑖, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜃)} 
where d is a binary indicator defined such that d=1 if the entrepreneur exited from his business 
and 0 otherwise; 𝜃 is the variance of frailty, which can be estimated from the data. 
The data for the analysis is drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79). We pick a sample of first-time entrepreneurs who entered business in the same year. 
Hence, those who started their business in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 are included in the 
entry cohorts.7 The final sample for the analysis using entry cohorts includes 534 entrepreneurs. 
The survival and exit rates by entry cohort are summarized in Table 1. The average exit rate 
varies from 49% to 69% across entry cohorts. The 2000 entry cohort has the lowest exit rate 
while the 1994 entry cohort has the highest exit rate. Overall, 57% of the self-employed exited 
their business within six years of startup, close to the 65% exit rate reported in national analyses 
of firm survival.  
The NLSY79 offers consistently designed lifetime income gamble questions to 
respondents in 1993, 2002, 2004, and 2006. In the hypothetical gamble questions, the individual 
is asked to choose between a safe job paying a fixed income and a risky job that will double the 
‘safe’ income or else pay only a fraction of the ‘safe’ income (such as 1/5 income cut, 1/3 
                                           
7 The NLSY79 conducted survey annually from 1979 through 1994 and biennially thereafter.  
16 
 
income cut, or 1/2 income cut) with 50% chance. Following Barsky et al. (1997), responses to 
the series of income gamble questions are used to elicit measures of risk attitudes. Degree of risk 
attitudes is measured by the degree to which the respondent is willing to accept downside risk, 
measured by the amount that could be reduced. For example, those who accept all the offers are 
placed into the least risk-averse category (4), whereas those who reject all the offers are placed 
into the most risk-averse category (1). The four risk acceptance index categories are constructed 
as follows:  




































This approach to measuring risk aversion using hypothetical gambling questions has 
been widely used in many empirical studies to explain entrepreneurial choice (Brown et al. 
2011), occupational choice between a fixed and a variable income job (Di Mauro and Musumeci 
2011), investment decisions (Charles and Hurst 2003), or even non-financial decisions (Sloan 
and Norton 1997; Bonsang and Dohmen 2015). One advantage of the categorical measure is that 
the risk categories can be ranked by risk aversion without assuming a particular form for the 
utility function (Barsky et al. 1997). A second advantage is that the occupational context used for 
the hypothetical gambles in the NLSY closely resemble the theoretical choice we pose where 
individuals are choosing between ‘riskier’ entrepreneurial ventures versus ‘safer’ wage work. 
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge some limitations of the measures from survey responses 
such as measurement error and a status quo bias as noted by Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball et 
al. (2008).  
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The distribution of the measured risk aversion for our entrepreneurial entry cohorts is 
presented in Panel A of Table 2. Overall, 40% of the entrepreneurs fall into the most risk averse 
category and 27 % fall into the least risk averse group. While there is no apparent systematic 
pattern to the distribution of the measured risk aversion across cohorts, these distributions 
indicate that there is considerable variation in measured risk attitudes in all the entry cohorts 
included in our sample. Panel B shows the distribution of risk preferences over time for the 1994 
entrepreneurial entry cohort. We compare the distribution of the risk preferences measured in 
1993 for the entire cohort to the distribution of 1993 measured risk preferences for conditional 
on being still in business in 2002. We add a second comparison, the distribution of selected and 
endogenous risk preferences, measured in 2002 for those remaining in business in 2002. As 
shown in Panel B, 52% of entrepreneurs fall into the most risk averse category and 26% fall into 
the least risk averse group when they started a business. However, among the surviving 
entrepreneurs, only 33% were in the most risk averse group while 37% of the surviving 
entrepreneurs were from the least risk averse category. However, when we measure the risk 
preferences of the surviving entrepreneurs in 2002, we found that these most successful 
entrepreneurs became less risk averse over time and so they evolved from atypically less risk 
averse before entry to more risk averse as they gained success. We get similar patterns of 
changing distributions of risk preferences when we repeat the analysis for the 1996 entry cohort.  
Clearly, risk preferences are affected by both selection on survival and measuring risk 
preferences after entry. 
 




This subsection investigates whether risk preferences of entrepreneurs are stable over time or if 
they respond to economic circumstances as our simple model suggests. To explore the transitory 
economic factors that alter measured risk attitudes, we must control for any underlying 
differences in tastes for risk across individuals. That suggests using a fixed-effects regression that 
will control for unobservable individual tastes and all other time-invariant factors (𝑢𝑖).
8 The 
linear regression model with fixed effects is  
𝜑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑀 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡, 𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2), t=1993, 2002, 2004, 2006   
As before, 𝜑𝑖𝑡 is an ordered categorical risk acceptance index variable for an individual 
i at time t. Our sample for the analysis includes all entrepreneurs who answered the risk 
questions in at least two years between 1993 and 2006 and who have complete information on 
demographic variables. The time-varying elements of the vector of (𝑀𝑖𝑡) include years of 
entrepreneurial experience, previous labor market experience, age, and any change in education, 
marital status, number of children, urban, and region of residence over the years. The individual 
fixed effects absorb gender, race, and other factors that do not change over the sample period. 
Previous labor market experience is measured by cumulative years spent at work until the time 
of entry into entrepreneurship since the first survey year, 1979. Entrepreneurial experience is 
measured by cumulative years spent in business since entry into entrepreneurship.  
The final sample for the analysis in this subsection includes 1,653 person-year 
observations. Entrepreneurs answering the risk questions included 235 respondents in 1993; 451 
in 2002; 493 in 2004; and 474 in 2006.9 
Table 3 reports estimation results. For brevity, we report only the estimates of key 
                                           
8 The Hausman test suggests that we can reject the null that random effects are appropriate for the model.  
9 Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix Table A.1. 
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variables of interest. Not surprisingly, changing economic circumstances do influence risk 
attitudes. Consistent with Brachert et al. (2017), willingness to accept risk increases with 
entrepreneurial experience. Entrepreneurs with more previous labor market experience are more 
risk averse. In contrast to the typical finding that people become more risk averse over time, we 
find that willingness to accept risk increases as entrepreneurs age. Perhaps, as entrepreneurs get 
older and gain business experience, they become more capable of managing risk. Risk 
preferences for entrepreneurs are not affected by marital status or education.  
 The results indicate that risk attitudes are endogenous to economic circumstances.10 The 
use of ex post collected risk attitudes or risk attitudes collected from surviving entrepreneurs will 
bias labor market outcomes regarding occupational choice, earnings, or entrepreneurship.  
 
6 Bias from endogeneity of risk attitudes and sample selection 
 
Having shown that measured risk preferences change with economic success, we now show how 
the use of endogenous risk attitudes and selected samples of entrepreneurs affect the relationship 
between risk preferences and probability of firm exit. We then illustrate how results change when 
we correct for only endogeneity, correct for only selection, and correct for both. The estimates in 
Table 4 are designed to illustrate the types of findings from previous studies.  
We begin with a sample of firms that entered between 1994 and 2002, but we only 
                                           
10 We also conclude the same when we do not restrict our sample to just entrepreneurs. We find that an individual’s 
risk attitudes change systematically in response to personal economic circumstances. Risk aversion increases with 
lengthening spells of employment and time out of labor force, and decreases with lengthening unemployment spells. 
Willingness to accept risk decreases with net family income at an increasing rate with peak risk acceptance at $307 
thousand, consistent with the assumption of increasing relative (or absolute) risk aversion utility. In effect, the 
correlation between income or wealth and risk attitudes remains unclear in prior literature. For example, Sahm 
(2012) finds that income and wealth have little impact on individual risk attitudes whereas Dohmen et al. (2016) 
show that household net income is positively correlated with willingness to take risk, but wealth has no significant 
effect. See the Appendix Table A.2 for the results.  
20 
 
include surviving firms as of 2002. That means that some firms had already survived as many as 
8 years while firms that entered and failed between 1994 and 2002 are excluded from the 
analysis. Risk preferences are elicited in 2002, 2004, and 2006, all after the entrepreneurs’ 
success has been established. The firm’s relative success is becoming more apparent over time.  
We then examine how these measures of willingness to accept risk are related to firm survival by 
2008 for the 2002 surviving firms. We use four risk dummy variables indicating increasing 
willingness to take on risk: from unwilling to take any risk, willingness to take low risk, 
willingness to take medium risk, and willingness to take high risk. 
We use various specifications to insure that our results are robust to different 
assumptions about the nature of the error terms and individual unobserved heterogeneity. The 
first column includes only the risk attitudes as regressors. Individual human capital and 
demographic variables are added in the second column. The third column adds controls for 
industry dummies. Technically these measures are endogenous as the entrepreneur picks the 
sector at the time of entry, and so these sectoral dummies should be excluded. Nevertheless, they 
are commonly found to affect firm survival (Taylor 1999) due to sector specific shocks that may 
differently affect profitability for firms in the same cohort. If we select an inappropriate baseline 
hazard function, unreliable estimates can result (Heckman and Singer 1984). Hence, in the last 
column we use a Tobit model as a robustness check, where survival time until an exit happens is 
the dependent variable. A positive coefficient on risk attitudes indicates longer survival time as 
wiliness to accept risk increases.  
We add controls for firm age along with other individual characteristics for the last three 
specifications. We use the lowest risk acceptance category as the base category. Thus, the results 
indicate how probability of firm failure changes as willingness to accept risk increases compared 
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to those who are the most risk-averse. For brevity, we report only the estimates of risk attitudes 
in the four specifications. The results are reported in terms of the implied hazard ratio: i.e., the 
proportional shift in the failure hazard function due to the movement to a higher level of risk 
acceptance, holding fixed all other factors including the unobserved frailty. A hazard ratio greater 
than one indicates that failure is happening faster than for the most risk-averse group.    
As shown in Table 4, when we use the risk attitudes measured in 2002, the hazard ratio 
for firm exit is higher for all entrepreneurs who express more tolerance for risk than for the most 
risk-averse group, similar to the findings of Begley and Boyd (1987) when they measure 
business success as liquidity. When risk attitudes are measured in 2004, there is an initial drop in 
the failure hazard and then an increase. However, none of the coefficients is statistically 
significant except for the risk acceptance level 2 in the second and third specifications, 
suggesting that the probability of firm exit modestly decreases with risk acceptance. When we 
replace risk dummies with the ordinary risk acceptance index, there is no significant relationship 
between measures of risk acceptance and firm survival across all the specifications. Similarly, 
when the 2006 measures of risk acceptance are used, the failure hazard initially falls as risk 
acceptance rises, but then rises dramatically. However, the difference is statistically significant 
only for those with risk acceptance levels 3 and 4 in the first specification and level 4 in the next 
two specifications, which makes it hard to draw a conclusion on the relationship between risk 
attitudes and failure hazard. When we replace the risk dummies with the risk acceptance index, 
however, the hazard of firm exit increases significantly as risk acceptance index increases.  The 
results are similar when we use the Tobit model. Overall, the most risk averse are the most likely 
to survive when using risk attitudes measured in 2002 and 2006, while the most risk averse are 
the most likely to fail when using risk attitudes measured in 2004.  
22 
 
The inconsistency in estimated relationship between measured risk preferences and firm 
survival is remarkable in that the dependent variable is the same measure of firm survival 
through 2008 for all 3 sets of survival analysis. Only the timing of the measure of risk attitudes 
varies. Hence, the varying results are due to the increasingly endogenous measures of risk 
preferences as they evolve with the observed relative firm success or failure. The following 
subsections will show how the results change when we correct for only endogeneity, correct for 
only selection, and correct for both.  
 
6.1 Bias from selection of surviving firms 
 
We illustrate the role of sample-selection on firm survival by correcting only for endogenous risk 
preferences. To do that, we use measured risk attitudes in 1993, the earliest measure available in 
the NLSY79. Entrepreneurs who entered business before 1993 were dropped. This ensures that 
we will only include the entrepreneurs used in Table 4 analysis for whom we have an exogenous 
risk measure uninfluenced by observed firm success or failure. The results are reported in Panel 
A of Table 5. The failure hazard initially drops and then rises, but the difference is statistically 
significant only for those with risk acceptance level 3 relative to the level 1. When we replace the 
risk dummies with the ordinal risk acceptance index and its squared term, however, there is an 
apparent U-shaped relationship between risk attitudes and hazard rates of exit and all the 
coefficients are significant, similar to the results reported by Caliendo et al. (2010) and Nieβ and 
Biemann (2014). 
 




To isolate the effects of endogenous measures of risk preferences, we use a complete sample of 
all firms entering in the same year rather than a sample of surviving firms. We use the entire 
cohort of entering entrepreneurs in years 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Analyzing business 
survival from startup is particularly important because it enables us to avoid left-censored 
entrepreneurial spells that have already selected out the most prone to failure. Setting a common 
starting point also insures that all firms in the same cohort are subject to the same 
macroeconomic environments. To address the issue of bias resulting from the endogenous risk 
attitudes measured after the respondent has already been in business, we employ risk attitudes 
measured in 2002, which means all of the measured risk attitudes are responding to the firm’s 
realized relative success or failure.11 The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. Across all 
the specifications, there is no apparent systematic pattern to the relationship between risk 
attitudes and the probability of failure. Moreover, none of the coefficients is statistically 
significant so we cannot reject the hypothesis of no relationship between measured risk 
preferences and firm success.  
 
6.3 Correcting for both endogeneity of risk attitudes and sample selection 
 
In this subsection, we re-estimate our frailty hazard regression and Tobit regression by correcting 
for both endogeneity and sample selection. We do this by considering the universe of all 
entrepreneurs who started a business in a given year from 1994 to 2002 and we use risk attitudes 
measured before the year of entry. As before, we define entrepreneurial survival as remaining in 
                                           
11 The results remain robust to the use of risk attitudes measured in 2004 and 2006.  
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business at least 6 years after startup in the frailty hazard model. The results are reported in Panel 
C of Table 5.12 Clearly, there is no evidence of a U-shaped relationship between risk preferences 
and firm failure or the rising risk of exit as willingness to accept risk rises as reported by prior 
literature. Instead, the hazard rate for firm exit drops monotonically as willingness to accept risk 
increases. Focusing on the second specification, those with risk acceptance levels 2, 3, and 4 
have 23%, 36%, and 46% lower exit hazard rates than the most risk-averse entrepreneurs.13 The 
Tobit model generates similar results. As willingness to accept risk increases, survival rate 
increases.  
 While we believe that our measure of risk attitudes is exogenous as it is measured prior 
to entry into entrepreneurship, risk attitudes might be driven by intention to become self-
employed in the future, since startups are often planned. In order to check such potentially 
endogenous risk attitudes, we use the IV approach employed by Brachert et al. (2017). Parental 
entrepreneurial experience has a strong effect on their offspring’s entry into self-employment 
(Lentz and Laband, 1990; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), but there is no reason to believe that 
parental entrepreneurship experience directly affects the probability of business exits. Therefore, 
we use a parental entrepreneurship as an instrument for risk preferences. For the analysis, we 
perform an IV probit with a binary dependent variable coded as 1 if the entrepreneur exited from 
his business within the first 6 years and 0 otherwise. Panel D of Table 5 presents estimation 
results. Specifications (5), (6), and (7) use the same control variables as those used in the 
                                           
12 The full estimates are reported in Appendix Table A.3.  
13 We use risk attitudes measured in 1993 which is then used for the survival of entrepreneurs in a much later 
period. This could lead to attrition problems in the data. However, the results are not sensitive to different 
combinations of entry cohorts. The linearly negative relationship between risk acceptance and exit hazard rate holds 
up well for 94 entry cohort only, 94-96 entry cohorts, 94-98 entry cohorts, and 94-2000 entry cohorts. See Appendix 
Table A.4.  
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specifications (1), (2), and (3), respectively. As shown, the monotonically negative relationship 
between risk attitudes and hazard of failure remains robust, although the estimate loses precision 
in specification (7). Most importantly, the Wald test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity at standard significance levels. On the other hand, when we use risk attitudes 
measured after entry into entrepreneurship or risk attitudes collected from only surviving firms, 
the Wald test always easily rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity, consistent with our 
argument that risk preferences are endogenously influenced by selection on firm survival and 
entrepreneurial outcomes. 
In Table 6 we re-estimate the relationship between risk acceptance and probability of 
firm exit using linear and quadratic forms of measured risk attitudes based on the second 
specification in Panel C of Table 5. In column (1), we replace the risk dummies with the ordinal 
risk acceptance index. We find that the hazard of firm exit falls significantly as risk acceptance 
increases. In order to test the quadratic relationship between risk attitudes and the hazard of firm 
exit, we add the quadratic term in column (2). As shown, the quadratic term is not statistically 
significant. In columns (3) and (4), we replace the ordinal risk acceptance index with the 
estimate of the inverse of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant relative risk aversion computed 
using the responses to the risk acceptance questions. The inverse Arrow-Pratt coefficient 
increases with risk tolerance. The results show that less risk-averse entrepreneurs are more likely 
to survive in their business, and again we cannot reject that the relationship is monotonic.  
For sensitivity analyses, we first alternate the time window over which to judge a 
venture’s survival and failure with 8 years. The results are reported in Table 7. The 
monotonically negative relationship between risk attitudes and hazard of failure holds up for the 
window of 8 years. When we test for the linear and quadratic functional form assumptions with 8 
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years, only the linear specification is statistically significant, consistent with the result from 6 
years. 
As an added robustness check, we estimate the hazard regression model using 
entrepreneurial entry cohorts from 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The results are reported in Table 8. The PSID provides similar risk 
questions as in the NLSY79 but it asked more hypothetical gambling questions.14 This gives six 
risk attitude categories instead of the four categories that were present in the NLSY79. To make 
the PSID comparable to the results using the NLSY79, we converted the 6 PSID risk categories 
to 4 by combining risk acceptance categories 3 and 4 into a combined third category and by 
combining risk acceptance categories 5 and 6 into the fourth, most accepting of risk group. 
Specifications are identical to those in Panel C of Table 5 using the NLSY79.  
Panel A of Table 8 shows the result using four risk attitude dummies. As before, the base 
category is the lowest risk acceptance category. Clearly, in comparison to the base category, the 
hazard ratio drops progressively as willingness to take risk rises, consistent with the result from 
the NLSY79. In Panel B, we replace the risk attitude dummies with the six ordinal risk 
acceptance values. The hazard rate falls as willingness to take risk increases and all the 
coefficients are statistically significant. When we add a quadratic term in the risk index to the 
regression as shown in Panel C, none of the coefficients is statistically significant, which 
suggests that the linear specification in the risk index is sufficient. This confirms a monotonically 
negative relationship between willingness to accept risk and exit hazard rates. The results are not 
sensitive to alternative time windows defining survival.  
In Figure 1, we plot predicted hazard ratios to illustrate the pattern of exit hazard rates at 
                                           
14 PSID offers the lifetime income gamble questions to respondents in 1996 only. 
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different levels of risk acceptance focusing on the second specification used in Table 5 and Table 
8. The four relationships displayed in Figure 1 differ depending on whether the sample is 
complete or selected on survival and whether ex ante or ex post risk acceptance measures are 
employed. As shown, the general pattern of the graphs using ex post measured risk preferences 
or including only current entrepreneurs is that the predicted hazard ratios decrease initially and 
then rise again. However, after correcting for both endogeneity and sample selection, probability 
of failure falls monotonically as willingness to accept risk increases. Moreover, the least risk-
averse are the least likely to fail, contradicting the conclusion derived when endogenous risk 
preferences and selected samples are employed. Indeed, entry into entrepreneurship and its 
experience do affect an individual’s risk attitudes and entrepreneurial survival increases with 
willingness to accept risk (Brachert et al. 2017).  
It seems that the least risk averse entrepreneurs possess the best set of entrepreneurial 
cognitive skills that lead to successful business. This finding is consistent with lab experiments 
that find that willingness to take risk is positively correlated with higher cognitive ability 
(Frederick 2005; Dohmen et al. 2010; Benjamin et al. 2013; Dohmen et al. 2018). Recently, 
Taylor (2013) and Beauchamp et al. (2017) also found that the positive correlation between risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability is evident when measuring risk preferences using hypothetical 
settings such as those used in the NLSY and the PSID.15 Our finding is also in line with recent 
findings that higher cognitive skills improve the quality of decision-making under uncertainty 
(Grinblatt et al. 2011; Hasting et al. 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). Taken as a whole, these 
findings substantiate our result that the least risk averse entrepreneurs have the highest survival 
                                           
15 The potential correlation of risk acceptance and cognitive ability leads us to check if our regression suffers from 




probability in the sense that the least risk averse are apparently those who can best assess and 
manage risks. Consequently, one explanation for our result is that entrepreneurs with greater 
ability also have greater willingness to accept risk, and thus have higher survival probability. In a 
similar vein, more risk averse individuals choose a safer investment paying lower expected 
returns (O’Donoghue and Somerville 2018). The lower returns induce more risk averse 
entrepreneurs to drop out of low value ventures sooner.  
As suggested by a referee, our finding that firm success rises monotonically with 
willingness to accept risk is subject to the risk measurements used in the NLSY and PSID.  
These measures of risk attitudes are more limited than some used in other studies and may not 
cover all possible risk preferences. In particular, the 4-point scale from the NLSY79 and the 6-
point scale from the PSID may not allow the full range of preferences from risk aversion to risk 
neutrality to risk-loving as was allowed in studies using as many as 11 risk preference groups. 
Our conclusions may be partially consistent with findings of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between risk attitudes and firm survival if we do not properly capture taste options such as true 
risk neutrality or risk loving. Nonetheless, our results do demonstrate the roles of endogeneity 
and selection bias, given consistently measured risk preferences over time in two longitudinal 
data sets composed of entrepreneurs. Moreover, the bias is in the direction predicted by a simple 
model of entrepreneurial entry and exit. That means that regardless of the measure of risk 
preferences used, one should be cautious about these two sources of bias. Endogenously 
measured risk attitudes and sample selection on firm survival will bias the observed correlation 
between risk attitudes and firm survival. Moreover, our results imply that these two sources of 
bias will cloud any attempt to relate risk preferences to other labor market outcome such as labor 




7 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
This study shows that endogenously measured risk attitudes and selection on surviving firms can 
bias the observed correlation between risk attitudes and firm survival. Using a simple two-period 
model, we show why nonrandom sorting out of entrepreneurship based on risk aversion can bias 
the estimated relationship between entrepreneurial survival and risk preferences. When risk 
attitudes are elicited only from current entrepreneurs, the measures are subject to a selection bias 
in that unsuccessful entrepreneurs are excluded. When the risk attitudes are collected after 
entrepreneurial entry, the risk preferences will endogenously reflect the realized success of the 
business. Indeed, the NLSY79 confirms that risk attitudes change over time with individual 
economic circumstances.  
Data on entrepreneurs from the NLSY79 and the PSID show that when risk attitudes are 
measured subject to selection and endogeneity, mixed or even positive correlations between risk 
acceptance and the probability of firm exit occur. Selecting on entrepreneurial success causes an 
upward bias in measured effects of risk aversion on firm success, while endogenous ex post 
measures of risk attitudes bias the effect of risk aversion on firm success towards zero. Which 
effect is stronger likely will vary by data set, but both work against finding that risk aversion 
lowers firm performance. The bias is in the direction predicted by our simple model of 
entrepreneurial entry and exit. When we correct for these two sources of bias, we find that 
probability of firm success rises monotonically as willingness to accept risk increases. Moreover, 
these risk preferences that are not subject to selection or endogenous response to success pass 
Wald tests of exogeneity, while risk preferences subject to selection or endogenous response 
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routinely fail these tests. 
Our finding that conclusions differ depending on whether entrepreneurial success is 
measured using a cohort of new entrants who will ultimately succeed or fail rather than a 
selected sample of survivors has broader implications for the conduct of empirical research on 
entrepreneurial success. A wealth of research has linked entrepreneurial orientation to firm 
success.16 Entrepreneurial orientation represents a firm’s strategic orientation and behavior 
related to its commitment to innovate, proactively address challenges, and take on risk. Most 
studies measure the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation using a survey of existing firms with 
questions derived from or similar to those developed by Covin and Slevin (1989). These 
questions relate to the firm’s pace of product introduction or research and development, its past 
stance toward competition, and its manager’s willingness to take on risk. 
What is curious is that these questions assume the ongoing existence of a hierarchical 
firm with multiple products and markets, and so the questions are not relevant for the majority of 
start-ups. Moreover, the questions are posed presuming the firm has been in business for at least 
five years, but clearly the responses to the questions would be shaped by the past success of the 
firm. Firms that are developing new products, engaged in R&D, and taking on risk are able to do 
so because they have been relatively successful, and so all of these measures are endogenous. 
Because the questionnaires are submitted to existing firms, many firms have already been sorted 
out through failure, and so the variation in measures of entrepreneurial orientation is due solely 
to the relatively successful survivors. 
Note that papers that claim to control for selection only do so correctly if they include 
                                           




random samples of all the members of the firm entry cohort, survivors and failures. Correcting 
for the selection of subsequent failures from among a sample of surviving firms, as in Wiklund 
and Shepherd (2011), does not correct the data for selection. Their sample of firms had all been 
in existence for some time and so their responses to the Covin-Slevin (1989) battery of questions 
would already reflect the endogenous responses of the sampled firms to their own relative 
success and the exclusion of the responses of the firms that had already failed. 
Our conclusion that less risk averse entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed is 
consistent with recent experimental evidence linking cognitive ability with a greater willingness 
to accept risk (Frederick 2005; Dohmen et al. 2010; Benjamin et al. 2013; Dohmen et al. 2018) 
or higher cognitive skills and the quality of decision-making (Grinblatt et al. 2011; Hasting et al. 
2013; Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). These findings substantiate our result that the least risk averse 
entrepreneurs have the highest survival probability in the sense that the least risk averse are 
apparently those who can best assess and manage risks. Our result is also consistent with the 
presumption that risk neutral entrepreneurs will maximize the expected present value of profit 
and survive more readily than their more risk-averse peers entering at the same time.  
Although we find strong and consistent evidence that the least risk averse entrepreneurs 
are the most successful, our analysis is limited by the risk measures included in the NLSY and 
the PSID data sets. These measures do not allow risk loving preferences and have only a few 
degrees of risk aversion that are expected to span the range of possible preferences. Our firm 
performance measure cannot differentiate between involuntary exits (mainly bankruptcies) and 
voluntary sales or liquidations. Future studies would be necessary to establish if our conclusions 
are sensitive to improved measures of risk preferences and firm success.  
Our analysis also fails to consider two other sources of selection. The first is that our 
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results are conditional on a sample of entrepreneurs, and so we do not control for the nonrandom, 
selection into entrepreneurship. To the extent that the decision to become an entrepreneur is 
predicated on attitudes toward risk, we cannot generalize our findings to the population of 
workers who have never been entrepreneurs. The more interesting and more complex source of 
selection that we pointed out in the expanded theory is that both the mean and the variance of the 
selected ventures will be affected by attitudes toward risk and the skill of the entrepreneur. If the 
least risk averse have greater unmeasured skills as suggested by some of the experimental studies 
cited above, then there will be nonrandom selection into riskier and less risky ventures which 
will complicate any firm conclusions about the relationship between risk preferences and firm 
success. Future analysis will have to explore these deeper questions about how risk preferences 
shape the distribution of entrepreneurial risk preferences and abilities across heterogeneous 
ventures.  
From a policy perspective, understanding how ex ante risk preferences affect 
entrepreneurial success is important for fostering new firm entry. As suggested by Konon and 
Kritikos (2019), if we could correctly identify which nascent entrepreneurs would be successful, 
or even which individuals in the population should become nascent entrepreneurs, we could 
encourage those with the ‘right stuff’ to start businesses. We could also direct venture capital 
support to those most promising entrepreneurs. Because willingness to accept risk is likely to be 
correlated with other important talents that improve likelihood of success, it is unlikely that such 
assessments should be based on measured risk preferences in isolation. If, for example, less risk 
averse individuals are those who can better assess and manage risks, then training more risk 
averse entrepreneurs to better understand risk management practices may improve the success of 
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Table 1 Six-Year Survival and Exit Rates by Firm Entry Cohort (NLSY79): 1994-2002 
 Firm cohort birth year and age range of entrepreneurs 





















































Note: Number of observations is reported with percentage in parenthesis. Survival is measured based on at least 6 




Table 2 Distribution of risk aversion (%) NLSY79 
Panel A: Entry cohorts & ex ante Risk attitudes measured in 1993 
Risk acceptance index 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 Overall 
1: Most risk averse 52 % 35 % 34 % 39 % 43 % 40 % 
2 9 % 12 % 14 % 7 % 11 % 11 % 
3 13 % 24 % 22 % 24 % 25 % 22 % 
4: Least risk averse 26 % 29 % 30 % 30 % 21 % 27 % 
Total Observation (N) 99 147 103 67 118 534 
Panel B: 1994 Entry cohort and risk attitudes 
 1993 risk measured 
from who started in 
1994 
1993 risk measured from 
those who remain in 
business in 2002 
2002 risk measured 
from those who remain 
in business in 2002 
1: Most risk averse 52 % 33% 67% 
2 9 % 11% 15% 
3 13 % 19% 7% 
4: Least risk averse 26 % 37% 11% 
Total Observation (N) 99 27 27 
Panel C: 1996 Entry cohort and risk attitudes 
 
1993 risk measured 
from who started in 
1996 
1993 risk measured from 
those who remain in 
business in 2002 
2002 risk measured 
from those who remain 
in business in 2002 
1: Most risk averse 35 % 30% 45% 
2 12 % 13% 13% 
3 24 % 25% 17% 
4: Least risk averse 29 % 32% 25% 




Table 3 Effects of Economic Circumstances on Entrepreneurs’ Measured Willingness to Take 
Risk over Time from 1993 to 2006 (NLSY79) 
 Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Cumulative entrepreneurial 





Cumulative labor market 

















Year dummies  √ 
Total person-year observations  1,653 1,653 
Note: Risk acceptance index varies from 1 (the most risk aversion) to 4 (the least risk aversion). t-statistics are in 
parentheses. */**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%. Other controls include number of children, male, white, urban, and 





Table 4 Estimated Effect of Willingness to Accept Risk on Failure Hazard Rate by 2008, Using 
Endogenous Risk Attitudes and Selected Sample of Surviving Entrepreneurs as of 2002. 
 (1) Frailty hazard (2) Frailty hazard (3) Frailty hazard 
(4) Tobit 
Survival 
2002 Risk attitude dummies      




































Observations (N) 638 638 638 638 
2004 Risk attitude dummies     




































Observations (N) 637 637 637 637 
2006 Risk attitude dummies     




































Observations (N) 634 634 634 634 
Entry cohort dummies √ √ √ √ 
Demographics included  √ √ √ 
Industry dummies included   √  
Note: The Risk index varies from 1: most risk-averse to 4: least risk-averse. t- statistics reported in parenthesis. 
***/**/* significance level at 1%/5%/10%. Demographic controls in columns (2), (3), and (4) include education, 
previous labor market experience, age, parental self-employment or management experience, marital status, number 
of children, and region.  
43 
 
Table 5 Estimated Effect of Willingness to Accept Risk on Failure Hazard Rate: Correcting for Selection 













Panel A: Use of ex ante measured risk preferences and selected sample of all firms born after 1994 and 
surviving as of 2002 
1993 risk attitude dummies      



























1993 ordinal risk index      




















Panel B: Use of endogenous risk preferences measured after entrepreneurial entry for firms born in 1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 
2002 risk attitude dummies      




























2002 ordinal risk index      




















Panel C: Use of ex ante measured risk preferences 1993 for firms born in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002  
1993 risk attitude dummies      




























Panel D: IV approach (5) IV Probit (6) IV Probit (7) IV Probit   










Wald test of exogeneity: 𝑃(𝑊 > 𝜒2(1)) 0.333 0.467 0.503 
 
 
Wald test of exogeneity: 𝑃(𝑊 > 𝜒2(1)) 
when using ordinary risk index02 





measured from entry cohort 
Wald test of exogeneity: 𝑃(𝑊 > 𝜒2(1)) 
when using ordinary risk index02 
measured from surviving entrepreneurs 
0.000*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
 
699 
Note: The risk index varies from 1: most risk-averse to 4: least risk-averse. t- statistics reported in parenthesis. 
***/**/* significance level at 1%/5%/10%. Entry cohort dummies are included in all specifications. Demographic 
controls in columns (2), (3), and (4) include education, previous labor market experience, age, parental self-
employment or management experience, marital status, number of children, and region. Industry dummies are 
included in column (4). W is the Wald test statistic in Panel D, and the associated values are the probability that the 







Table 6 Estimated Effect of Willingness to Accept Risk on Failure Hazard Rate: Linear and Quadratic 




























Inverse Arrow-Pratt coefficient squared    
1.129 
(1.55) 
Entry cohort dummies √ √ √ √ 
Demographic control variables √ √ √ √ 
N 534 534 534 534 
Note: The risk index varies from 1: most risk-averse to 4: least risk-averse. Demographic controls include education, 
previous labor market experience, age, parental self-employment or management experience, marital status, number 





Table 7 Sensitivity Analysis by Alternating Time Windows Defining Survival: Using ex ante Measured 
Risk Preferences and Entry Cohorts (1994-2002) 













Alternating time window: 8 year period     






















































Entry cohort dummies √ √ √ √ 
Demographics included  √ √ √ 
Industry dummies included   √  
N 416 416 416 416 
Note: Demographic controls include education, previous labor market experience, age, parental self-employment or 
management experience, marital status, number of children, and region. t- statistics reported in parenthesis. ***/**/* 




Table 8 Sensitivity Analysis by Alternating Data Set, PSID Based on Exogenous Risk Measures and 
Entry Cohorts (1997-2005) 



































































Entry cohort dummies √ √ √ √ 
Demographics included  √ √ √ 
Industry dummies included   √ 
 
N 296 296 296 296 
Note: Demographic controls include education, previous labor market experience, age, parental self-employment or 
management experience, marital status, number of children, and region t- statistics reported in parenthesis. ***/**/* 









Figure 1 Risk preferences and probability of firm exit 
 
Notes: The graphs a, b, c, and d are based on the results in Table 8, Panel B of Table 5, Panel C of Table 5, 
































PSID, Full Sample, ex ante riska 
NLSY, Full Sample, ex ante riskc 
NLSY, Selected Sample, ex ante riskd 






Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean (Std) 
Variables Definition 1993 2002 2004 2006 
Risk accept index Ordered categorical variable (1-4) 
1 = the most risk averse 



















Work experience Previously labor market 

































































































Total observation (n)  235 451 493 474 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table A.2 Effects of Recent and Cumulative Economic Circumstances on Measured Willingness 
to Take Risk over Time from 1993 to 2006 (NLSY79) 
 Linear Regression Ordered Probit 
 Fixed effects Random effects Clustering 
Time-varying economic factors    

















































Age squared 0.001* 
(1.74) 
0.0004 
(1.33)   
0.0003 
(1.16) 





























Total observation (n) 21,706 21,706 21,706 












Note: Risk acceptance index varies from 1 (the most risk aversion) to 4 (the least risk aversion). t-statistics are in 









































Previous Labor market 









































































Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Yes 
4 region dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes  














Log likelihood -644.24 -623.58 -620.96  
LR test for 0    𝜒2̅̅ ̅(1)=33.50*** 𝜒2̅̅ ̅(1)=27.04*** 𝜒2̅̅ ̅(1)=26.94***  
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Table A.4 Sensitivity Analysis by Alternating Entry Cohorts Using Exogenous Risk Measures 
 









94 entry cohort     
























94 & 96 entry cohorts     
























94, 96, & 98 entry cohorts     
























94, 96, 98, & 2000 entry cohorts     
























Note: t- statistics reported in parenthesis. ***/**/* significance level at 1%/5%/10%.   
 
 
